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THE 1982 DEBT CRISIS AND 
RECOVERY IN CHILE 
Michael Margitich 
The financial crisis which struck Chile 
during the early 1980s was the most serious in 
its recent history and shattered the brilliant pic-
ture of economic prosperity observed in Chile 
during the years following the 1973 coup. In 
this article I attempt to analyze some of the 
major causes of the crisis, how they might have 
been avoided, and what was done to stimulate 
the recovery of the Chilean economy in the 
mid-to-late 1980s. I also discuss the measures 
taken in Chile since the crisis in order to assess 
the possibility of a reoccurrence of another 
severe economic crisis in Chile's future. 
Prelude to the Crisis: "The Crisis 
Was Not Supposed to Happen in 
Chile ... " 
When the debt crisis hit Chile in the early 
1980s, it was the last thing that Chile's econo-
mists expected to happen. As Whitehead states, 
"However widespread and forceful its impact, 
the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s 
was not supposed to happen in Chile .... " 
(Whitehead, p. 117) The international financial 
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community had not hesitated in placing Chile 
on a pedestal of sorts, categorizing it as "differ-
ent" and somehow in better economic shape 
than the rest of its Latin American neighbors. 
Most late 1970s advocates of free-market eco-
nomics believed that the long-term changes in 
economic philosophy that Pinochet's "Chicago 
Boys" (so named because they had studied eco-
nomic policy at the University of Chicago) had 
brought upon Chile after the 1973 coup did 
indeed set Chile apart from the rest of the con-
tinent. Closest in economic performance and 
policy was Argentina, but even it was considered 
less committed to these so-called "neo-conser-
vative" free-market economics and privatization 
issues. Chileans had created a strong founda-
tion for bringing their economic philosophies 
into practice -Argentina simply did not have 
as thorough an understanding of these new con-
cepts as Chile did. In addition, historians may 
debate on and on the issue of whether a dicta-
torship such as Pinochet's was a necessary con-
dition for Chile's economic turnaround without 
reaching a conclusive resolution. However, it 
cannot be denied that Pinochet's administration 
did possess a great unity and determination, 
believing that it had "saved Chile from 
Marxism," and therefore internal friction and 
resistance was kept at a minimum. (Whitehead, 
p. 117) Arguably one of the greatest character-
istics of Chilean history has been the govern-
ment's ability to bring policies- especially 
those intended to restructure society as a whole 
-from initial design to implementation effec-
tively. Pinochet's Chicago Boys all carried the 
same ideologies to the many policies imple-
mented to further the concept of a free-market 
economy. These policies had the underlying 
goals of increasing the flexibility of Chile's econ-
omy and its ability to adapt well to external 
shocks. In addition, they attempted to create 
strong links with major sources of capital in the 
capitalist countries. The final result of these 
policies would ideally be economic growth and 
prosperity, which would in turn lead to a solid-
ification of national pride among Chileans. By 
approximately 1980, Chile had every reason to 
believe that this great economic transformation 
had truly been brought about and that the 
Chicago Boys had worked their miracle. 
Many other economic indicators added to 
the reassurance that Chile was riding high dur-
ing Latin America's times of uncertainty. 
Throughout the rest of the world, public spend-
ing was on the rise and comprising a larger and 
larger percentage of the GDP of most countries. 
Between 1970 and 1980, public expenditure in 
Chile had peaked at 44.9 percent of GOP, but by 
1980 that figure had been reduced by almost 
half to 23.1 percent. The rest of Latin America 
was increasing the size of its public sectors and 
running fiscal deficits while Chile was doing 
just the opposite. In 1980 Chile ran a surplus 
of 3.1 percent of its national income. 
(Whitehead, p. 118) 
Inflation also was running rampant 
throughout the rest of Latin America during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. In contrast, in 
1981 Chile's consumer price index increased at 
a single digit rate (9.5 percent) for the first time 
in almost 20 years. Just five years earlier, the 
Chicago Boys had been struggling to bring 
down an inflation rate that had hit over 200 per-
cent. Even more spectacular was the 1,000 per-
cent hyperinflation that followed the 1973 mil-
itary coup. Controlling inflation was one of the 
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achievements that the Pinochet administration 
was most proud of and was a major source of 
increased confidence in its economic philoso-
phies. (Whitehead, p. 119) 
Interest rates told another encouraging 
story in Chile during the early 1980s. The rest 
of Latin America had held interest rates below 
the inflation level. This scheme was creating, 
in effect, negative real interest rates, which 
were actually penalizing the savers in the econ-
omy and greatly benefiting those who had bor-
rowed funds. (Whitehead, p. 118) As econom-
ic models such as the Solow growth model 
illustrate, discouraging saving in an economy 
is generally not a recommended course of 
action for economic growth. But Chile was 
once again ahead of its Latin American coun-
terparts with real interest rates which had 
become increasingly higher and more positive 
as the inflation rate dropped during the late 
1970s. By 1980, these rates were not quite as 
high, but had settled in at the accepted "nor-
mal" rate of around 10 percent. Maintaining a 
respectable level of savings in the Chilean econ-
omy was another reason to expect continued 
growth and prosperity. 
Finally, excessive foreign borrowing by 
Chile's South American neighbors was increas-
ing at a very rapid pace during the 1970s. These 
countries consistently experienced high debt-
to-service ratios throughout the decade. Before 
the 1973 coup, Chile was in the same position, 
suffering from extremely high external public 
debt. Mter the coup, Chile had very little access 
to international credit until1977, and its exter-
nal debt increased very slowly, if at all. In 1978, 
Chile did see an increase in external borrowing, 
but up until1979 had still accumulated very lit-
tle debt, mainly because the need for foreign 
borrowing wasn't as prevalent as in other Latin 
American nations. Chile's government was 
running a surplus which it could use to finance 
projects, and the government itself was 
attempting to reduce its level of economic 
intervention (and therefore needed less capital 
to fund such interventionist activities). 
(Whitehead, p. 120) With 1979 came a com-
pletely different story, however, which will be 
explained more fully in the next few sections. 
Taking all of these factors into considera-
tion, one would easily be inclined to agree with 
those free-market economists who insisted that 
"whatever financial problems might arise else-
where in the early 1980s, there should be no 
comparable debt crisis in Chile .... " (Whitehead, 
p. 121) Chile's "neo-conservative experiment" 
had apparently solved many of its major eco-
nomic problems. Unfortunately, these solutions 
also proved to be almost totally ineffective 
against some of Chile's other major problems. 
For example, unemployment continued 
on a steady upward trend, even after all of the 
Chicago Boys' policies had been put into effect. 
In addition, the multitude of favorable indica-
tors masked the problems that Chile was hav-
ing with its balance of payments - especially 
after the introduction of the fixed exchange rate 
in June of 1979. The decision to peg the 
exchange rate at 39 pesos to the dollar was one 
of the most controversial decisions of the 
Pinochet administration, and many economists 
believe it to have been the policy most respon-
sible for the onset of the debt crisis. Finally, in 
1979 Chile saw a huge inflow of commercial 
bank credit entering its economy, which later 
provided Chile with an equally huge debt prob-
lem to deal with. 
As one economist during the first decade of 
Pinochet's rule said in the Wall Street Journal, 
"I have never been in a country where for five 
years all the indicators were going in the right 
direction: exports, health, housing, income, 
infant mortality- you name it." (Schumacher, 
p. D4) However, although Chile was showing 
strong signs of economic prosperity during the 
late 1970s, the first cracks in the Chilean model 
were beginning to appear. Pinochet and his 
administration were convinced that the eco-
nomic recovery that they had triggered was com-
plete and permanent, and had confidence that 
their policy decisions were the correct ones. 
However, confidence has a tendency to turn into 
stubbornness when things begin to fall apart, 
which is exactly what the early 1980s brought on 
the eve of the debt crisis. 
Full Stores and Empty Pockets: The 
Onset of Crisis 
ANew York Times headline from May 2, 
1983, read: "Full Stores and Empty Pockets Tell 
Chile's Story." After enjoying annual growth 
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rates of around 8 percent between 1977 and 
1981 (to the delight of General Pinochet), Chile's 
GDP plunged by over 14 percent in 1982. 
Unemployment in the Santiago area had 
reached nearly 22 percent, and in the provinces 
was said to have reached 30 percent. Company 
after company collapsed under mountains of bad 
debt, and Chile's banks had become almost com-
pletely insolvent. Latin America's economic 
miracle was now facing more than $18 billion 
of foreign debt, rising inflation (once again), 
massive capital outflows, and a great sense of 
distrust that its people were developing towards 
the Pinochet administration. (Schumacher, 
p. D4) Before long, Pinochet found himself dis-
missing all 16 members of his cabinet on April 
20, 1982, out of frustration and desperation. 
("Chilean Cabinet is Dismissed") The entire 
continent, as well as the rest of the world, was 
left wondering how Chile, the so-called wun-
derkind of Latin America, had come to this. 
Were the Chicago Boys completely wrong 
in their policy prescriptions for Chile? While 
Pinochet's economists did commit some critical 
policy errors, their free-market economic visions 
and suggestions certainly had potential. They 
did accomplish the desired reduction in infla-
tion, and had put Chile on the path to econom-
ic prosperity. However, in an article entitled 
"Unintended Lessons from the Chicago Boys," 
Mrs. Lucy Schwank writes, "The misfortunes of 
the Chicago Boys ... merely prove that free-mar-
ket principles cease to work only when they are 
abandoned." (Schwank, p. 9) As the next section 
will illustrate, the introduction of Chile's fixed 
exchange rate - a decidedly non-free-market 
policy decision- would prove to be a major fac-
tor in bringing on the financial crisis. 
"Latin America's Jinxed Bandwagon": 
The Fixed Exchange Rate 
During the decade and a half following 
Chile's debt crisis, many of the possible causes 
of the crisis have been analyzed and debated. 
However, one recurring sentiment pervades 
most of the popular accounts of the crisis: 
Pinochet's decision to fix Chile's exchange rate 
at 39 pesos to the U.S. dollar was his adminis-
tration's most serious policy error. 
Schumacher affirms this observation, stating 
that "the overwhelming consensus among gov-
ernment officials and economists today is that 
the beginning of the end began in 1979, when 
Sergio de Castro, then Finance Minister, 
imposed the fixed exchange rate .... " 
(Schumacher, p. D4) It signaled the first real 
departure from the free-market policies that the 
c·hicago Boys had implemented, and arguably 
triggered all of the other events leading to the 
collapse of the early eighties. Had Chile's 
exchange rate policy been handled differently, 
recession may not have been completely avoid-
ed, but at the very least it would have been 
much less painful. 
Before 1979 Chile's exchange rate was fre-
quently monitored and adjusted via a "crawl-
ing-peg" system. Up until mid-1976, the peso 
was devalued approximately two or three times 
per month. After a slight revaluation of 11 per-
cent in 1976, the government switched to daily 
devaluations at a pre-announced rate. There 
were additional intermittent sudden revalua-
tions, but for the most part this close monitor-
ing of the exchange rate continued in a similar 
fashion during most of the 1970s. The princi-
pal goal of this intense supervision and adjust-
ment of the nominal exchange rate stemmed 
from Chile's constant fear of inflation. After 
watching inflation soar above 600 percent dur-
ing the years following the coup, Pinochet's 
administration took it upon itself to keep infla-
tion under control at all costs. It is true that 
the inflationary effects of the tightly controlled 
peso devaluations were minimal, and by the end 
of the 1970s it did appear that Chile's long-
standing inflation troubles had been defeated. 
Chile's official exchange rate remained fairly 
consistent with the market rate (the "real" 
exchange rate), and therefore its foreign 
exchange market was, for all intents and pur-
poses, a free exchange market. (Whitehead, pp. 
133-34) However, by 1979 Chile was still see-
ing annual inflation rates of 38.9 percent-
lower than the ridiculously high rates of five 
years earlier, but still not acceptable to Pinochet 
and his Chicago Boys, who were more com-
mitted to anti-inflation policy than any other 
administration in Latin America at that time. 
Hence, in June of 1979 the fateful decision was 
made to peg the Chilean peso to the U.S. dollar 
at an official exchange rate of 39 pesos to the 
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dollar. This somewhat anti-free-market deci-
sion placed an effective ceiling on any inflation 
Chile was to suffer and provided the additional 
benefit of instilling the confidence of a stable 
currency in the minds of foreign investors who 
were considering sending their funds to Chile. 
At first glance, it seemed to be a veritable stroke 
of genius. However, textbook economics shows 
that committing to such strong anti-inflation 
goals without regard to cost usually requires 
one to accept significant increases in unem-
ployment, as well as to make sacrifices in terms 
of total output. 
At the end of the 1970s, the U.S. dollar was 
rapidly declining in value, and was considered 
weak relative to the appreciating peso. U.S. 
President Carter's economic policies were help-
ing keep the value of the dollar low in the inter-
national market. With the exchange rate at 39 
pesos to the weak dollar, it didn't take very long 
for international investors to see the bargain. 
International reserves increased dramatically 
as Chile was flooded with the dollars of 
investors buying up the strong Chilean pesos. 
The interest rate on peso deposits in Chile had 
risen above the U.S. interest rate on dollar 
deposits. As the economy flourished, Pinochet 
gained credibility as a very capable head of state. 
Though the 1980 presidential election in 
the U.S. may not have been an item of concern 
to most Chileans, hindsight reveals it to have 
been a critical turning point in Chile's eco-
nomic well-being. Had President Carter been 
re-elected, the value of the dollar would have 
most likely remained weak compared to the 
Chilean peso, and the 39 pesos-per-dollar 
exchange rate would have continued to draw 
the dollars of international investors in waves. 
The Chilean peso would have continued in its 
role as a strong, reliable investment to hold. 
Unfortunately for Pinochet's policy makers, 
when President Reagan took office his 
announced goals for the nation included a com-
mitment to keeping the dollar strong. His 
Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul Volcker, 
enforced a tight monetary policy; and as the 
dollar regained -its strong position in the world 
market, Chile helplessly watched its peso weak-
en in the grip of the fixed exchange rate. 
(Schwank, p. 9) 
What followed was no surprise. The 
investment "bargain" was now the promise of 
one strong dollar for 39 weak pesos. Both 
Chilean and foreign investors quickly noticed 
this and traded in their weakening pesos for dol-
lars. Capital inflows, after skyrocketing in 1979, 
started disappearing as quickly as they had 
arrived. This massive flight of what was, in 
actuality, merely speculative capital was disas-
trous to the banking sector of Chile. Net 
inflows of capital, which were a very encourag-
ing 15 percent of GDP at the beginning of 1981, 
fell to a scant five percent of GDP by 1982. 
(Schwank, p. 9) 
Looking back to June 1979, it is inevitable 
for one to consider whether this crushing blow 
to the Chilean economy would have occurred 
had the decision been made to continue float-
ing the exchange rate, rather than to fix it. 
While it is true that Chile had become an attrac-
tive place to foreign investors during the late 
1970s (relative to most of the countries in the 
region) due to its controlled inflation and steady 
GDP growth rates, the nation would not have 
seen anywhere near the deluge of foreign capi-
tal had the exchange rate been allowed to float 
at near-market rates. The majority of that spec-
tacular 15 percent net capital inflow seen in 
1981 was nothing more than purely speculative 
capital. It did not enter the country with the 
goal of building up enterprises through pro-
ductive investment and was certainly not 
intended to remain in Chile for the long-term. 
The capital was attracted by the disparities 
resulting from the defense of the infamous fixed 
exchange rate. As soon as the advantage of 
holding Chilean pesos disappeared, the specu-
lators withdrew their investments. Capital 
flight triggered by the U.S. monetary policy 
change would not have been as severe had the 
exchange rate been allowed to float, as floating 
exchange rates are generally self-stabilizing and 
do not place such enormous drains on interna-
tional reserves. (Schwank, p. 9) 
It is important to note that when the for-
eign capital disappeared, it left behind many 
problems with which Chile had to deal. After 
the exchange rate was fixed, international cur-
rency reserves had soared, as would be expect-
ed given the relative strength of the peso. In 
1980 alone, such reserves in Chile rose by near-
ly 180 percent. However, to defend its fixed 
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exchange rate, Chile found itself needing to 
inject nearly 70 billion pesos into the nation's 
money supply to buy up the immense amount 
of foreign currency. The chain-reaction results 
of such a move should have been clear to 
Pinochet's administration. Following the 
increase in the money supply, the majority of 
Chileans developed a fear of the country's dread-
ed inflation returning once again. During peri-
ods of expected inflation, a large increase in the 
demand for loans is generally observed. Savvy 
consumers, businesses, and the like will borrow 
money which still holds value today in the 
hopes of paying it back in currency which will 
be worth less by some future time, when those 
debts come due. This is exactly what occurred, 
setting the banks up for the banking crisis 
which started as early as late 1981. As expect-
ed, the inflation did hit, but not until the begin-
ning of 1983 when it jumped back from the 
encouragingly low 9.5 percent of early 1982 to 
the more "normal" (for the Latin American 
region) 25 percent. Compounding the prob-
lem, savings began falling, once again due to 
the fear of inflation, and the nation's interest 
rate began a steady climb. 
In effect, by implementing the fixed 
exchange rate policy, Chile had promoted, and 
in fact had encouraged, foreign investments 
that were too great for Chile's financial system 
to absorb. When foreign investment disap-
peared, the fixed exchange rate deterred, and in 
actuality "taxed," any additional investment. 
(Schwank, p. 9) But even while listening to the 
cries of Chilean businessmen, farmers, and oth-
ers suffering from the loss of competitiveness 
in the international market brought about by 
his administration's exchange rate policy, 
Pinochet refused to devalue. A 1982 Wall Street 
Journal article quoted Pinochet's chilling warn-
ing to dissidents (italics added for emphasis): 
"The country has begun to overcome the crisis, 
showing the first signs of a revival that will be 
very slow at first, but will be sustained. Those 
who fail to understand this will abide by the 
consequences." ("Chile's Pinochet Says 
Recession Easing") 
Fueling Pinochet's stubbornness were both 
his finance minister, Sergio de Castro, who had 
created the fixed exchange rate, and the presi-
dent of Chile's central bank, Alvaro Bardon. 
Bardon pointed out that the recession in Chile 
had reduced imports and created a low inflation 
rate, which should have increased the competi-
tiveness of Chile's exports. He made frequent 
visits to New York banks attempting to convince 
them to extend more credit to his country, 
asserting that "[the U.S.] will see us begin to 
recover in three or four months, independently 
of what happens with the U.S. economy." 
(Martin) A peso devaluation would only spark a 
rash of inflation, he argued. However, even as 
U.S. critics cried out about the distortions that 
a fixed exchange rate can cause in an economy, 
citing as proof the continuing deterioration of 
Chile's economic situation, bankers remained 
eager to push Chile towards their goal of a free-
enterprise economy and continued to lend. One 
such U.S. banker, still intent on loaning to Chile 
as late as 1982, predicted with confidence: "They 
are going through a shakeout that was almost 
deliberately set up. The government wants only 
those companies that have a comparative advan-
tage in world competition to survive. We will see 
a recovery by 1983, definitely. What will come 
out will be a stronger private sector and the 
whole experiment will be fully successful." 
Unfortunately, what actually ensued painted 
quite a different picture. (Martin) 
The Failure of the Banking Sector 
By 1982 interest rates had become 
extremely high once again, and the weakness-
es in the banking sector became painfully evi-
dent. One of the major steps taken by the 
Chicago Boys towards financial liberalization 
was the privatization of Chile's banking system, 
intended to stimulate savings and investment 
and to further the pursuit of a true free-market 
system. Unfortunately, what was actually seen 
was a drop in savings from about 16 percent of 
GDP during the 1960s to about 12.4 percent 
between 1975 and 1981. A significant drop in 
the level of investment was observed during the 
same period as well. The principal explanation 
for these unintended results of the privatization 
experiment was the decision to eliminate all of 
the credit controls that had initially been put 
into place to direct capital into production, 
rather than into pure consumption. This sud-
den freedom triggered a massive increase in 
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consumption, especially among Chile's middle 
class - an increase which was satisfied by an 
equally large increase in imports, damaging 
Chile's trade balance. (Whitehead, p. 127) 
Debtors of the time period seemed oblivi-
ous to the losses they were suffering due to the 
high interest rates on their borrowed money. 
At these high interest rates, banks were very 
willing short-term lenders, and these debtors 
found that the alternative to facing up to their 
debts was to borrow more. Incredibly, the inter-
est alone accumulated on peso loans between 
1977 and 1982 accounted for over 70 percent 
of the peso debt that remained outstanding by 
the end of 1982. As this overlending epidemic 
spread, debtors began to realize that their trou-
bles were a part of a greater crisis- a realiza-
tion which weakened their incentive to take 
action to fix their individual problems. This 
behavior, though destined to ruin the banking 
system, was continued as debtors assumed that 
a typical Chilean wave of inflation would bring 
negative real interest rates which would save 
them from their debt. 
At this point, one begins to question the 
nature of the relationships between debtors and 
creditors in the Chilean financial system. In a 
normal, solid financial system, there is the con-
stant requirement of transparency- all par-
ticipants are "reasonably well informed" about 
each other's expected behavior. It should not 
take much time for creditors to realize when a 
potential recipient of additional credit is in fact 
no longer creditworthy. However, this sort of 
transparency simply did not exist in Chile, in 
no small part due to the nature of Pinochet's 
reign itself. Under Pinochet, the situation was 
such that Chileans "did not have the right to 
know what the authorities wished to conceal, 
and the courts assumed the impunity of the 
most powerful, so why should it be any differ-
ent in the realm of finance?" (Whitehead, 
p. 128) The recipients of the over-extensions of 
credit were Chilean enterprises who were well 
aware of this sort of financial environment, 
bizarre as it may have seemed. The lenders, on 
the other hand, were to a large degree foreign 
bankers, with no sense of the non-transparent 
Chilean financial sector. The combination of 
the ignorance of foreign lenders to the impend-
ing banking disaster and the perhaps too-rapid 
financial liberalization, which proceeded with-
out any type of restraint, led to the collapse of 
the Chilean financial sector. Even on the eve of 
the crisis, most foreign creditors were still 
unaware that the majority of the Chilean 
debtors to whom they were lending were com-
pletely uncreditworthy. 
By May 1981, CRAV, one of the largest pri-
vately owned firms in Chile, declared bank-
ruptcy, triggering the fall of many smaller firms 
and banks. By the end of 1981 Chile announced 
that its financial institutions were $2.5 billion 
in debt, more than twice the total amount of 
capital possessed by all of them. Banks were 
making unreasonable loans to their owners and 
were suffering from the overlending that had 
taken place during the boom in capital inflows 
at the end of the 1970s. As mentioned earlier, 
1982 saw GDP fall by a disastrous 14.3 percent. 
During the course of the next few years, Chile's 
Central Bank was forced to absorb the debt of 
the private banking system, a policy decision it 
had earlier promised not to make, emphasizing 
the merits of privatization. By 1985, 14 of the 
26 national banks and 8 out of 17 financial insti-
tutions were under state control- quite iron-
ic, given the government's commitment to a 
reduction in state control of such institutions. 
(Martinez and Diaz, p. 59) Pinochet, who had 
sworn not to devalue Chile's currency from the 
fixed exchange rate of 39 pesos to the dollar, 
approached his finance minister on March 24, 
1983, under pressure from the IMF, with the 
words "I have decided to devalue." In effect, 
these actions constituted an admission on 
Chile's part that it was in deep financial trou-
ble and desperately needed help. Along with the 
IMF, the World Bank also took notice of Chile's 
dire situation and stepped in to set Chile on the 
road to financial recovery through a complete 
restructuring of its financial system. 
The World Bank's Four Projects: 
Recovery from Crisis 
After the initial shock of the crisis had 
passed, Chile was able to step back and analyze 
its current economic situation. During the 
years in the aftermath of the crisis, Chile's gov-
ernment moved swiftly to implement major 
policy reforms and to restructure institutions. 
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This was in no small part aided by huge 
amounts of lending from the World Bank. The 
World Bank granted loans to Chile to fund four 
targeted projects aimed at rebuilding the near-
ly ruined Chilean financial system. These proj-
ects were essentially allocations of money to the 
sectors of Chile's economy that could most ben-
efit by them. The World Bank's loans to Chile 
were designed to accomplish three similar aims 
and objectives, against which their success or 
failure could be measured. First and foremost 
of these objectives was to simply aid the Chilean 
government in dealing with a steadily worsen-
ing recession that was taking a serious toll on 
the financial well-being of the country. 
Secondly, the Bank had observed Chile's recent 
struggles with failure in medium- and long-
term financing and was hoping to improve the 
situation through intervention. Finally, the 
financial sector itself was in grave need of assis-
tance, and, in fact, a thorough restructuring. 
(OED Precis) The World Bank looked to pro-
vide the means for such structural adjustments. 
Through analysis of the four projects, it can be 
seen how difficult it is to structure and initiate 
an effective plan of recovery in the midst of a 
crisis, when the benefits of experience and hind-
sight are non-existent. However, with each pro-
ject important lessons were learned as to the 
proper design of such undertakings, and as a 
result successive attempts were increasingly 
more successful. 
Industrial Finance Restructuring 
Project 
As previously stated, immediately after the 
height of the banking crisis in 1982-1983, the 
Chilean government stepped in to rescue its 
banks from certain disaster. By guaranteeing 
deposits and providing large amounts of emer-
gency liquidity assistance to the private banks 
most in need of help, many institutions were 
saved from the brink of insolvency. However, 
the system was left in a state of disrepair. 
Foreign debt was dangerously high, and uncer-
tainty was running rampant among the surviv-
ing banks as well as the policy makers of the 
country. Realizing that outside help was the 
only remaining solution, Chile approached the 
World Bank with a request for assistance. The 
Bank responded with the Industrial Finance 
Restructuring Project (IFRP), a loan in the 
amount of $100 million. Initialized in parallel 
with the IFRP was the $40 million Small and 
Medium Industry Project (SMIP), the second 
Bank loan approved in 1985. (OED Precis) 
The IFRP had as its principal objective the 
overall financial restructuring and strengthen-
ing of large industrial firms, aimed at encour-
aging fixed investment and developing a per-
manent working capital base. A technical unit 
was set up in the central bank in order to pro-
vide assistance in corporate restructuring, as 
well as to control and manage the financing of 
firms that wished to receive this aid. 
The idea for the IFRP was actually con-
ceived in 1983, when Chile was still in the 
proverbial eye of the storm and the recession was 
in full swing. The industrial sector was believed 
by many to be inches away from complete bank-
ruptcy, and therefore the project was carefully 
constructed to provide both financial restruc-
turing as well as the means for investment in 
new plants and new equipment to place these 
floundering industries on an upward track. 
However, the Bank assumed that the already 
weakened industries would be able to perform 
dramatic restructuring while handling the influx 
of new loans for the purpose of plant expansion. 
In a recent report, the Bank conceded that "from 
the start, this unusual design hindered the 
implementation of the project." (OED Precis) 
During the two years it took to bring the 
loan from conception to reality, economic con-
ditions in Chile had changed substantially. By 
1985 Chile was well on its way out of the reces-
sion, and there were many signals of econom-
ic recovery showing up throughout the coun-
try. However, the IFRP was never redesigned, 
or even re-evaluated, to take into consideration 
the changed (and indeed, improved) economic 
environment. It took until May of 1987 for the 
World Bank to make changes to the rules for 
loan dispersal. Previously, the IFRP had 
required struggling industries to go through a 
thorough financial restructuring before they 
would receive any aid for standard industry 
projects and new equipment. Under these con-
ditions, the Bank received very few requests for 
loans through the IFRP. However, after the 
conditions were changed to allow industrial 
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companies to finance projects without restruc-
turing, the loans were quickly requested and 
distributed. (OED Precis) 
Small and Medium Industry Project 
Conceived at approximately the same time 
as the IFRP was the Small and Medium Industry 
Project (SMIP) in the amount of $40 million. 
Its principal goal was the reduction of Chile's 
high unemployment by giving assistance to 
small- and medium-sized companies, in the 
hopes of creating more job opportunities and 
promoting expansion. However, according to 
Imogen Mark, correspondent for the Financial 
Times in Chile, the project was "mostly politi-
cal, to keep workers happy after the devaluation 
of the peso." (Mark) Many of these small-to-
medium sized enterprises were the ones that 
got hit the hardest when Pinochet agreed to 
devalue the Chilean peso, leaving many work-
ers displeased with their situation. It was a 
reactionary measure that perhaps needed bet-
ter planning before its implementation. 
What the SMIP correctly determined was 
that the main obstacle to capital acquisition 
faced by these small enterprises was simply mar-
ket failure in the medium/long-term lending 
capital market. In one respect, the SMIP did 
alleviate some of the problems dealing with lack 
of strong medium/long-term lending practices 
with its introduction of "risk-capital" funds. 
Basically an experiment in venture capital, what 
these were supposed to do was provide new com-
panies and enterprising individuals with access 
to equity and working capital in order to encour-
age the growth of the SME (small-to-medium 
enterprise) sector. Confused by the astonish-
ingly low demand for these funds when they 
were introduced, the World Bank failed to notice 
that Chile's track record was virtually devoid of 
any type of venture capital operations. As a 
result of the economic shake-ups of the late 
1970s and early 1980s in Chile, most of the 
country's financial institutions had become 
strongly risk-averse. (OED Precis) 
From this observation, another question 
arises- were Chilean enterprises and individ-
uals well-educated enough to be risk-averse? 
This observation, made by Imogen Mark dur-
ing an interview with the author in Chile, stems 
from the fact that the over-lending practices of 
the early 1980s seem to indicate that "people 
are convinced that they can get away with crazy 
things." (Mark) In addition, with no history in 
venture capital, Chile was largely uneducated 
as far as how to make it work for its struggling 
SME sector. Mr. Vladmir Radovic, a director of 
the Chilean branch office of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), further confirmed 
this underlying problem with the SMIP, indi-
cating that there is still very little investment 
in new companies in Chile. Only recently, more 
than a decade after the Bank projects were set 
into motion, has the IDB taken steps to intro-
duce a venture capital fund to Chilean small 
enterprises. The Multilateral Investment Fund 
administers grants to innovative projects in the 
private sector which need an initial source of 
capital. However, so far the only loans have 
been granted to existing groups, such as min-
ing companies. As was observed in the after-
math of the SMIP, there have been very few 
loans granted to new companies for expansion-
ary investment. (OED Precis) 
Industrial Finance Project and 
Financial Markets Loan 
The partial failures of the first two projects 
set the stage for the improved design of the 
other two Bank projects - the Industrial 
Finance Project (IFP) and the Financial Markets 
Loan (FML). Both were redesigned as a result 
of the lessons learned from the IFRP and SMIP. 
The $75 million IFP was designed as a cousin of 
sorts to the IFRP, aimed at providing medium-
and long-term financing for industrial enter-
prises, but with more emphasis placed on build-
ing up medium-size firms by offering invest-
ment opportunities. The FML, on the other 
hand, had somewhat different goals from the 
other three projects. $100 million was granted 
to the Chilean government, not only to 
strengthen and provide medium-term financing 
opportunities, but principally to reinforce and 
"deepen" the securities markets. (OED Precis) 
Impacts/Outcomes of the Four 
World Bank Projects 
More favorable economic conditions and 
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the experience of two less-than-successful proj-
ects contributed to the greater effectiveness on 
the whole of the IFP and the FML. In addition, 
the IFRP and the SMIP did, as the World Bank 
reports, "provide long-term financing of viable 
investment projects at a time when no other sig-
nificant sources of financing existed," and did 
help stimulate the economic recovery. (OED 
Precis) By the end of the 1980s, firms which had 
received loans out of the IFRP were seeing 
increases in revenues of more than 50 percent 
per year. In addition, the SMIP benefited over 
1,700 small-to-medium sized enterprises, most 
of whose newly created investments were indeed 
profitable. The "investment momentum" cre-
ated in the medium-to-large enterprise sector 
with the introduction of the IFRP was preserved 
with the arrival of the IFP, which ensured con-
tinual growth through encouragement of addi-
tional investments. The businesses receiving its 
aid experienced a general increase in profitabil-
ity, and the loans stimulated these companies to 
begin exploring non-domestic markets, such as 
MERCOSUR. (OED Precis) 
However, the strengthening of the finan-
cial sector that these loans attempted to accom-
plish wasn't entirely realized. Many of these 
loans benefited only the weaker banks, who 
took the loans mainly because borrowing in the 
financial market was much more costly due to 
risk adjustments. Secondly, the SMIP saw the 
participation of very few commercial banks -
in fact only 28 of the loans dispersed passed 
through the commercial banking system. On 
the other hand, the FML was considered a great 
success, which contributed to rapid growth of 
Chilean pension funds, life insurance compa-
nies, and the securities exchange. Pension fund 
real assets nearly tripled between 1989 and 
1994, and the number of stocks on the 
exchange has grown substantially. (OED Precis) 
Finally, both the banking and corporate 
sectors have become much stronger institu-
tions through careful monitoring after the cri-
sis had subsided. The government formed com-
missions to step in and watch over the firms 
that had been nationalized during the crisis, 
planning their eventual reprivatization. In 
addition, in 1987 a new banking law was creat-
ed which demanded greater transparency in the 
activities of Chile's banks and other lenders, 
thus addressing the major flaw in the Chilean 
system. The law also replaced the state's uncon-
ditional deposit guarantees with a more con-
trolled guarantee system that would require the 
sharing of risk by shareholders, bank creditors, 
and depositors, in addition to the state. The 
Central Bank suffered heavy losses during its 
bailout of the banking system (11 percent of 
GDP during 1985 and 1986), but the new bank-
ing regulations strengthened the system and 
insured it against another crisis of such mag-
nitude. (Moran, p. 4 77) 
Conclusions 
In only one decade, Chile's banking system, 
and in fact its entire financial sector, was turned 
around from near bankruptcy into the success 
story of Latin America. In fact, Chile has 
emerged as one of the most attractive capital 
markets to investors in the region. The Chile of 
the 1990s has been a symbol of renewed eco-
nomic hope and prosperity. Once again, Chile 
has been consistently ahead of its neighbors 
with respect to GDP growth, according to sta-
tistics presented by Hans Rudolf, International 
Finances Coordinator in Chile, during an inter-
view with the author. Current rates of annual 
inflation are near 6 percent- normal for most 
developed countries, but truly spectacular for 
Latin America - and Chile is still working to 
reduce inflation even further to reach the levels 
of industrialized economies. (Rudolf) Partially 
responsible for these encouraging figures was 
the 1990 decision to make the Central Bank of 
Chile completely independent of the federal gov-
ernment. All decisions on monetary policy are 
now made outside of the government, bringing 
to mind the image of Pinochet stubbornly refus-
ing to abandon his fixed exchange rate while the 
Chilean economy spiraled downward. Since the 
end of the 1980s, Chile has enjoyed more than 
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a decade of fiscal surplus, and government 
expenditures have decreased significantly after 
peaking in 1982 (when the government bought 
up the non-performing portfolios of many of 
Chile's banks). (Rudolf) 
Can this sort of growth continue in Chile 
without terminating in crisis again, as was seen 
in the late 1970s? Signs are certainly promis-
ing. Chile's rate of savings has increased to 24 
percent - while the remainder of Latin 
America averages about 15 percent. Statistics 
show that this domestic saving is also leading 
to increased domestic investment- construc-
tive investment in new facilities, which is cre-
ating more than enough capacity for Chile to 
grow in the future. In addition, to discourage 
the type of rapid inflow and outflow of specula-
tive capital that spelled disaster for Chile in the 
1980s, Chile implemented a tariff on short term 
capital during the 1990s which was only recent-
ly relaxed. The regulation mandated that Chile 
keep a certain percentage of all capital entering 
the country for a full year after its entry, regard-
less of when the investment was pulled out, 
thereby creating a "tax" on short-term capital, 
encouraging long-term investments and reduc-
ing the overall volatility of foreign investment. 
In conclusion, whatever problems exist in 
Chile's economy today pale in comparison to 
the problems of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The Chile of today presents a far more stable 
financial environment and promising outlook 
on the future than during the dark days of its 
debt crisis. Investors worldwide recognize the 
opportunities that Chile can provide and have 
far more confidence in sending their funds to 
the once-troubled Latin American nation. The 
dropping of the "tax" on short-term capital and 
the reduction of import tariffs are strong indi-
cators that Chile has moved beyond the repair 
and recovery phase, and is poised to move 
onward and upward in the global marketplace. 
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